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Abstract: In this introductory chapter to a collective volume dealing with the political economy of 
entrepreneurship,
* we argue, based on a suggested unifying framework, that political economy is a 
fruitful approach to entrepreneurship. The importance of institutions in structuring such an analysis is 
also emphasized. The introduction also introduces the selected articles and puts them in context. Vital 
functions of the capitalist economy are ascribed to the productive entrepreneur, but the selected articles 
also show that the social value of entrepreneurship must be evaluated as it is realized. Three facets of 
entrepreneurship are claimed to be of particular importance from a political economy perspective: 
(i) Entrepreneurship is dynamic in the sense that it adapts to the politically determined institutional 
framework within which it acts. Under propitious circumstances, it can be a powerful engine of growth, 
but it can also be channelled in unproductive and destructive directions.  
(ii) Entrepreneurship enters directly into the political system. The close connection to property rights 
constitutes a link between entrepreneurship and private versus public ownership and redistribution. 
Under unfavourable institutional circumstances, rent-seeking and predatory entrepreneurship, via the 
political system, offer greater profit opportunities than the market.  
(iii) A political economy approach is necessary in order to understand how the political system 
shapes the institutional setup. Here, it is emphasized that the distribution of political power is partly 
determined by economic wealth. Hence, it is relevant to broaden the analysis to the effects on wealth 
creation and wealth redistribution stemming from entrepreneurial activity. 
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INTRODUCTION AND FRAMEWORK 
 
The wide array of definitions of entrepreneurship in the literature all entail different 
focuses such as risk taking, innovation or responsiveness to opportunities. To 
approach research in entrepreneurship is therefore to approach a seemingly 
fragmented research field. Still, the contributions in this diverse field have at least one 
noteworthy trait in common: Although many theorists have set out from one of these 
definitions, they have, at the same time, assumed the distinguishing characteristic of 
their choice to be at the core of the capitalist economy. More importantly, this has 
often been done in order to highlight a crucial distinction vis-à-vis a socialist 
alternative. A prime example is Joseph Schumpeter’s (1942) analysis of the 
(inexorable) demise of capitalism in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy and how 
this is fundamentally linked to the waning importance of entrepreneurship. Even more 
striking is how capitalism and entrepreneurship are intertwined in the Austrian school 
of economics, e.g. in Israel Kirzner’s thinking. These influential examples illustrate 
how the political-economic aspects are at the centre of the economic analysis of 
entrepreneurship. 
As pointed out by Schumpeter in one of the texts we have selected for this 
Handbook, analysing the subject of political economy of entrepreneurship is by no 
means straightforward. Adding the famously illusive concept of the entrepreneur to 
the broad and somewhat vague notion of political economy brings forth a number of 
problematic issues of delineation and definition. The approach we have found to yield 
most structure to the analysis is to give institutions a central role. 
  The purpose of this introduction is to present a unifying framework of the 
political economy of entrepreneurship. In this way, we argue that political economy is 
a fruitful approach to entrepreneurship. We also emphasize the importance of the 
notion of institutions in structuring such an analysis. This introduction also serves the 
purpose of introducing the selected articles and putting them in context. 
The framework for analysing the political economy of entrepreneurship is laid 
out in figure 1. It is essential to this illustration and to our approach that we can only 
evaluate the entrepreneur (E) and entrepreneurial behaviour given the institutional 
context.
1 When viewed as a resource, the entrepreneur is, in this respect, very 
different from the usual capital and labour resources. Moreover, as we will see, once 
we consider the institutional setup, there is no guarantee that a potential entrepreneur 
will actually put his or her time and effort to (socially) productive use. 
Entrepreneurial activity affects the extent to which the economy is able to 
adapt to changing circumstances and renew itself through innovations. These two 
aspects correspond to the equilibrating function described by Kirzner and the 
Schumpeterian disequilibrating entrepreneur, respectively.
2 In practice, these 
functions are outcomes of new and different ways of combining resources in the form 
of human capital (H), physical capital (K) and labour (L) resources (for simplicity, we 
abstract from intermediate inputs and raw materials).
3 Metaphorically, capital and 
                                                 
1 Institutions have moved to the fore of mainstream explanations for economic performance, especially 
in the longer term. See, for example, North and Weingast (1989), Rodrik et al. (2004) and Acemoglou 
et al. (2005). 
2 See Baumol (2005) and Yu (2001) for a discussion of these two aspects and how they can be brought 
together in the same system. See also Kirzner (1999) for a critical assessment of this difference. 
3 In this respect, the model laid out in figure 1 has obvious similarities to Leibenstein (1968). He 
emphasizes the entrepreneurial function of bringing together different factors of production. Moreover, 
he points to two entrepreneurial functions in the development process: (i) introducing new techniques,   3
labour can be said to be put into more or less fertile soil, which allows for greater or 
less dynamism. In the limit, where the entrepreneur is removed from the analysis (or, 
for that matter, from the economic reality), this environment congeals, resulting in a 
static economy. This is the first link in the system, which is represented by (1) in 
figure 1. 
Together, the equilibrating and disequilibrating forces, capital in its human 
and physical form as well as labour, determine the economic outcome. Beside 
possible growth, the economic outcome also involves the distribution of economic 
resources. This brings us to the next two links in the system, denoted by (2) and (4). 
First, since economic strength can be translated into political power, it entails an 
ability to influence the political system, link (4). Second, in the context of 
entrepreneurship, political entrepreneurship provides a direct link between 
entrepreneurship and the political system, link (2). 
The final link (3) in this system is how the political system determines the 
formal institutions, and thereby also the pertinent institutions, i.e. the institutions that 
are relevant for entrepreneurial activity. It should be noted that institutions also 
directly affect various aspects of the resources, which is illustrated by a dotted arrow. 
Our focus here on certain pertinent institutions is due to pedagogical considerations 
and is made to facilitate a structured analysis of the role of the entrepreneur. It does 
not imply that we deny the relevance of other institutions and causal linkages. 
 
 




Link (1): Entrepreneurship in its institutional context 
The emphasis on the rules of the game is primarily due to Baumol (1990, 1993), who 
stressed that entrepreneurship can take on many different forms – some of which are 
productive, some unproductive and some even destructive. On the surface, the logic is 
deceptively simple. If the rules are such that it is beneficial for the individual to spend 
                                                                                                                                            
commodities, materials, markets or organizational form and (ii) creating new economic capacity. These 
roughly correspond to (i) the innovativeness and (ii) the ability to adapt in figure 1.   4
entrepreneurial effort on circumventing them, she will do so rather than using the 
rules to reduce uncertainty and enhance contract quality. In this case, the outcome is 
expected to be one where corruption and rent-seeking prevail over productive 
entrepreneurship. 
In reality, the interaction between various dimensions of the institutional setup 
and the type and level of entrepreneurial activity is highly complex and therefore 
difficult to disentangle. To give a hint of the complexity, consider table 1 below, 
where different motives for starting a business are given. The top row gives society’s 
first-best alternatives. Here, an entrepreneurial business is started because it provides 
the best vehicle for pursuing a business opportunity. Other, strictly speaking non-
entrepreneurial, motives are to give the owner the opportunity to pursue a certain life-
style, earn his/her living independently or facilitate the organization of certain projects 
best pursued as an independent firm but without being an entrepreneurial venture. 
In a second-best outcome, the entrepreneurial motives arise because of various 
obstacles barring the optimal arrangements. Entrepreneurship here provides a means 
of circumventing obstacles that could emanate either from policy failures or from 
within the private sector. For instance, inferior management and business 
organizations may prevent an intrapreneur from introducing and reaping the rewards 
from his or her ideas. Or the tax legislation could make the use of stock option 
incentives to encourage intrapreneurship prohibitively expensive. Other incentives are 
also at work; becoming self-employed can, for instance, be a way of escaping 
excessive labour regulation or, in a more general sense, achieving the kind of 
flexibility that is obstructed by regulations. These kinds of effects can probably 
explain the, seemingly paradoxical, high levels of small-business activity observed in 
many countries with extensive government involvement. 
In the most unfavourable case, the incentives are distorted towards exploiting 
the business opportunities arising from the regulation itself. Entrepreneurial incentives 
to start a business are geared towards exploiting tax breaks and subsidies rather than 
creating value. Sidestepping or reducing the impact of taxes and other legislation are 
also the prime motives for non-entrepreneurial businesses under this kind of regime. 
In a recent survey of the development status of Romania, Coyne and Leeson 
(2004:243) wrote: “There are two ways to interpret the situation in Romania. The 
standard interpretation, reflected in reports by development agencies, is that there are 
high barriers to entrepreneurs and, hence, a shortage of entrepreneurship. Another 
interpretation is that entrepreneurship in Romania is flourishing. The key is the 
distinction we made between productive, unproductive and evasive entrepreneurship. 
Productive entrepreneurship is currently stagnant in Romania. Unproductive and 
evasive entrepreneurship, on the other hand, are alive and well”. This illustrates the 
importance of conducting the analysis through the lens of the institutional setup. Few, 
if any, societies have managed to completely quell the individual’s innovativeness and 
pursuit of personal gains. The key difference is whether and to what extent they have 
managed to gain rather than lose from these human traits. 
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Table 1  Self-employment – A Typography. 
 Entrepreneurial  Non-entrepreneurial 
First best  1.  Pursue a business 
opportunity most suitably 
pursued in a new firm 
 
1.  Seeking independence, a 
certain life style etc. 
2.  Local service production; 
working in networks in 
temporary projects 
    
Second best  1.  Necessity entrepreneurship 
2.  Inferior management by 
current employer bars efficient 
intrapreneurship 
3.  Mechanism to escape the 
effect of discrimination or the 
lack of social capital for 
marginal groups 
1.  Safety valve to circumvent 
excessive labour market 
regulations 
2.  Means to achieve flexibility 
hindered by other regulations 
3.  Mechanism to escape the 
effect of discrimination or the 
lack of social capital for 
marginal groups 
    
Rent seeking  1.  Set up a business to exploit 
subsidies and tax breaks rather 
than create value for customers 
 
1.  Transform consumption 
expenditure into tax deductible 
business costs 
2.  Fraudulence, where revenue 
is partly unreported etc. 
Note: The table lists the major motives for self-employment. Entrepreneurial self-employment may 
partly be pursued in search of independence, and fraudulent rent-seeking may also be entrepreneurial. 
 
Links (2) and (4): Influence on the political system 
If link (1) accounts for the influence of institutions on entrepreneurship, the two 
remaining links in the system, (2) and (4), together with (3), can be said to describe 
the reverse causality. 
There is a great deal of inertia in most political systems. Many of the pertinent 
institutions are incarnated in written laws and documents, organizations and 
bureaucracies and not the least in individuals and social networks. All these entities 
take time to change, but it would be a mistake to infer that changes in these 
mechanisms can be omitted from the analysis. Links (2) and (4) highlight two reasons 
why this is especially true in an analysis focusing on entrepreneurship. 
First (4), modern history gives us many examples where successful 
entrepreneurship has resulted in exceptional accumulation of private wealth. In the 
context of political economy, we cannot neglect the political power that can be 
wielded with such fortunes. Beyond the individual, this also has the potential of 
making entrepreneurs influential as a group. 
Second (2), entrepreneurs are, by (at least most) definition, active in shaping 
their environment. Under the most unfavourable circumstances, current institutions 
make it profitable for entrepreneurs to direct their energy and talent to rent extraction. 
Instead of engaging in productive venturing, entrepreneurs act so as to bring about 
new legislation and institutions, designed to bolster their position. This can cement 
old structures that are detrimental to growth. But the opposite may, of course, also   6
happen. Entrepreneurs can take part in politics and with their insight into current and 
future development, contribute to a more adaptive institutional setup. 
 
Link (3): Politically induced change of institutions 
Institutions are commonly referred to as the rules of the game that govern the conduct 
of economic activity and that, in Baumol’s (1990) words, shape “the social structure 
of payoffs”. In a political context, it is useful to classify various rules depending on 
who sets them. For our purposes, the most obvious agent is the government, but there 
are also other important agents such as labour unions and lobbying groups.  
These are agents that actively try to influence and change existing institutions. 
This excludes rules that appear as side effects, such as many of the informal rules 
commonly called norms or values, which arise within a specific ethnic group, cultural 
community or a smaller group of people with frequent social interaction (Granovetter, 
1995). To the extent that these groups do not actively and consciously try to shape 
their institutional environment, they will not be included. It should be noted that with 
respect to entrepreneurship more generally, this selection is too restrictive and would, 
for instance, neglect the important aspect of social attitude toward entrepreneurship 
qua an individualistic venture (Hofstede, 2001). For instance, in Schumpeter (1934), a 
central argument revolves around how the entrepreneur broke away from old routines 
and how this required special powers in order to endure social resistance emanating 
from entrenched values. 
 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE HANDBOOK 
 
The various parts of the Handbook each deal with a topic that is an integral part of the 
framework presented here. The organization is easily explained by pointing at the 
place of each part in figure 1. 
 
o  Part I collects articles where the approach is overarching and which together 
serve to explain the design of figure 1 as a whole. 
 
o  Parts II to V deal with how various institutions affect entrepreneurial 
decisions, link (1) 
 
o  Part VI deals with link (2), and how the notion of political entrepreneurship 
implies a direct link from entrepreneurship to the political system. 
 
o  Parts VII and VIII deal with questions pertaining to how the institutions are 
shaped by the political system. Hence, they belong to link (3). 
 
o  Part IX is best characterized as belonging to link (4) which leads from 
economic outcome to the political system. 
 
o  The last two parts, X and XI, deal with questions that are best organized under 
link (1). 
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PART I  OVERVIEW 
 
In a short lecture note written just months before his death, Joseph Schumpeter [3] 
claimed that: 
 
…neither the analysis of the economic process – economics – nor the analysis of 
the political process – political science – is adequate by itself to explain actual 
sequences of events. This is the reason why so many writers have come to plead 
for a Political Economy which is to combine both and much besides. The 
difficulties that beset this line of advance, however, must be clearly understood 
(p. 193). 
 
The general framework, and the basic methodological assumptions of this Handbook, 
have a great deal in common with those developed by Schumpeter in this text [3]. As 
in Schumpeter’s text, the analysis guiding the outline of this Handbook is best 
described as a circular motion, where the purely economic aspects of a society (at 
least partly) determine central features of the political system and this system, in turn, 
is a crucial element in explaining the economic outcome. 
In Baumol’s text [1], the analysis of entrepreneurship and institutions is 
framed by a historical context. The growth of an entrepreneurial class (a bourgeoisie) 
is explained by the power struggle between kings and the noble upper classes. In 
order to raise armies, financially weak rulers were forced to concede more and more 
property rights to other classes. It gradually became apparent that more economic 
freedom spurred economic growth, something that gave liberal kingdoms an upper 
hand. Thus, entrepreneurs’ positive and productive response to institutional change 
created a shift in power, which further reinforced the move towards protection of 
private property. Baumol’s analysis explains the rise of a society where property 
rights were protected and individuals were given incentives to build private wealth as 
business owners. 
The success of the private enterprise became apparent in the process of 
industrialization, where private firms grew into large corporations. But what about 
new small firms, could they stand a chance against these giants? What if the historical 
success of the individual entrepreneur carried the seed of its own destruction from the 
very beginning? In the chapter “Crumbling Walls” [2], we meet this central argument 
of Schumpeter’s masterpiece Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. This is the well-
known prophecy about the mechanization and routinization of the entrepreneurial 
function and the waning role of the individual entrepreneur. In hindsight, we might 
doubt the accuracy of the prophecy, but the logic laid out about the walls (institutions) 
that are crumbling still deserves attention. 
Part of the reason why Schumpeter predicted that capitalism was coming to an 
end was its success over the aristocratic, elite class of rulers. Although this class 
might have constituted an obstacle in early stages of development, it later came to 
provide a protective layer against other interests. The new threat did not come from 
the elite, but from the proletariat, and its political power in a democratic society. 
Henrekson and Jakobsson [8] provide an analysis where they show that in many 
respects, Schumpeter’s prophecy almost came true in the Swedish welfare state. 
 
The general approach of this Handbook also draws much inspiration from the recent 
theoretical contributions by Acemoglu and Robinson [6]. Their result called captured   9
democracy is highly relevant for our purposes. Democratic institutions may have 
prevailed on the surface of things but underneath, a former elite can still continue to 
influence the de facto institutions. This teaches us something very important about 
inertia in institutional change and why new entrants in the economic market may face 
severe problems, despite better products and more efficient modes of production. 
This line of theorizing also highlights another aspect of entrepreneurship, 
namely its ability to proactively take part in and change the institutions. To capture 
some of the implications of this, we have tried to distinguish between institutional 
changes that are the result of a political process and changes that are more directly 
instituted by economic interests and individual political entrepreneurs. Since changing 
the institutional setup can generate large profits for certain groups, we would expect 
large flows of entrepreneurial talent and energy towards the political arena. This is 
one of the central arguments in Benson [7]. Another important argument in Benson is 
that regulation often breeds further regulation, because new rules create opportunities 
to earn profits by dodging the rules. Thus, politicians find it necessary to remedy 
loopholes by imposing new legislation. In this process, there is plenty of scope for 
entrepreneurs to act so as to influence the institutional framework in their favour. 
The entrepreneur is explicitly introduced in this analysis in Kirzner [4]. Here, 
entrepreneurship is defined as being fundamentally about alertness to and discovery 
of new opportunities, which brings to light a deep-seated contradiction regarding 
government interventions in the market. Implicit in all such interventions is an 
assumption that the government can accurately identify and implement the best ways 
of steering the economy. But, according to Kirzner, this is an entrepreneurial decision, 
and the market’s strength vis-à-vis a central government is to delegate this decision to 
millions of agents. This delegation makes the market a far superior mechanism for 
avoiding systematic errors. 
Kirzner’s approach is seemingly opposite to the Schumpeterian one. In the 
former, entrepreneurship is about discovering previously unnoticed opportunities and 
thereby remedying market error, whereas the Schumpeterian view is essentially about 
innovation. If the Schumpeterian entrepreneur disturbs existing equilibria, the 
Kirznerian entrepreneur moves the economy towards a state of equilibrium. These 
two entrepreneurs can be combined to generate a more complete view on the 
entrepreneurial role of the dynamics and development of an economy. Yu [5] does 
exactly this; by using the different functions embodied in the two approaches, he 
presents an account of economic dynamism via institutional change. 
 
 
PART II  PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 
The institutions that together provide a secure protection of private property rights are 
the most prominent by far. There are several reasons for this. First of all, the notion of 
property rights has an obvious connection to private property and therefore to profits 
and economic incentives. Second, the notion of property rights can be defined at an 
abstract level. For instance, by several accounts, taxation should be considered as an 
infringement of private property. Furthermore, various forms of regulations 
effectively erect barriers as to how private assets can be used, thereby reducing their 
market value. Both these circumstances have important implications for 
entrepreneurship, some of which are the topic of other parts of this Handbook. But the 
aspect of property rights that is of particular importance in this part is its intimate 
relation to investment, especially investment in small firms.   10
  The first paper in this part is a chapter from Hernando de Soto’s [9] book the 
Mystery of Capital. It is best introduced by a quotation: 
 
Capital, like energy, is also a dormant value. Bringing it to life requires us to go 
beyond looking at our assets as they are to actively thinking about them as they 
could be…Property is the realm where we identify and explore assets, combine 
them and link them to other assets. The formal property system is capital’s 
hydroelectric plant. This is the place where capital is born (p. 45 and p. 47, 
italics in original). 
 
De Soto emphasizes the crucial distinction between assets and capital. Capital is what 
holds the potential for economic dynamism and growth. Assets, without a system of 
property rights, he claims, are just dead matter. One of the most important effects of a 
well-functioning property rights system is that it determines the economic potential of 
assets; it thus enables the owner to envision ways of using the capital. Entrepreneurial 
ventures are the obvious vision relevant for our purposes. 
Without a well-functioning protection of property rights, not only will many 
potential entrepreneurs be reluctant to invest, but it also makes predatory forms of 
entrepreneurship more profitable. If the institutional framework does not channel 
entrepreneurship in productive ways, these individuals will devote their talent and 
energy to other things. Hence, poor property rights give more opportunities for 
various kinds of appropriative entrepreneurship, which further reduces the expected 
return to investment in productive entrepreneurship. This is modelled in Gonzales 
[11]. 
The transition of former socialist economies has provided an opportunity for 
an empirical evaluation of the consequences of poor property rights. Johnson, 
McMillan and Woodruff [10] is one of the largest and most ambitious surveys of this 
kind. They use a questionnaire to survey a large sample of manufacturing firms in five 
post-communist countries. Their main variable of interest is the extent to which firms 
reinvest profits. Such reinvestment is expected to be held back in a situation with 
weak protection of future returns. This conjecture is supported by their empirical 
analysis. Furthermore, controlling for credit constraints did not change the result. This 
was interpreted as suggesting that not only are secure property rights necessary, but 
also sufficient for productive investment. 
In empirical work, composite indexes of institutional quality are frequently 
used. There are often considerable measurement problems when trying to single out 
the effect of specific institutions. One instance where it has been possible to identify 
the effect of a single institution is the bankruptcy exemption level. How does the rate 
of compensation to the lender in case of bankruptcy affect the level of entrepreneurial 
activity? This is the empirical question raised in the article by Fan and White [12]. 
Theoretically, a higher exemption rate implies a lower risk for the nascent 
entrepreneur, which should spur the formation of small businesses. They test this 
hypothesis by using variations in exemption rates across US states. Their results are 
consistent with their hypothesis. 
 
 
PART III  TAXATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 
As noted in the previous part, taxation can be subsumed as a special instance of 
property rights legislation, because taxation directly affects the expected returns of an   11
investment. Thus, taxation enters directly as an explanatory variable in the decision to 
become an entrepreneur. But it also enters indirectly, and in ways that are less visible. 
One important aspect, which has not been subject to much research, concerns how 
taxes affect the formation of personal wealth and thus, the ability and willingness to 
venture into entrepreneurship. Another largely unexplored factor is related to timing 
and relative tax effects of early and late exit from a venture. 
  Much research on taxation and entrepreneurship has been done in the tradition 
of Domar and Musgrave [13]. Their conclusion was that high levels of taxation 
encourage risk-taking behaviour and, consequently, entrepreneurship. This result is an 
outcome of the assumption that governments do not only tax profits but also 
compensate for losses. This effectively reduces the variance in the distribution of 
possible outcomes, something that encourages risk-taking if risk aversion is assumed. 
As already discussed by Domar and Musgrave, the assumption of loss compensation 
is at odds with reality. It is rarely, if ever, the case that entrepreneurs who incur large 
losses receive direct (symmetric) transfers from the government corresponding to a 
negative tax. The issue of progressivity is also noteworthy. Domar and Musgrave’s 
result only holds under the assumption of constant marginal taxes. If progressive taxes 
are imposed, this will remove the symmetry between profit taxation and loss 
compensation. Regardless of these shortcomings, their analysis has lived on as an 
influential point of reference in the literature. 
Kanbur [14] frames the same analysis in an occupational choice model. 
Contrary to Domar and Musgrave, in this framework, the risky decision of whether or 
not to become an entrepreneur is a discrete choice. From this setting, he derives the 
result that the free market outcome exhibits too much risky behaviour, a result which 
is sensitive to certain assumptions on risk aversion, but still shows that the 
implications of taxation on risk taking are by no means self-evident. Here, the 
normative result is that the government should impose progressive taxes in order to 
restrain the level of entrepreneurial activity.  
Robson and Wren [15] explore the differential impact of marginal and average 
tax rates on self-employment and salaried employment. Their analysis features 
another prominent component in the literature on taxation and self-employment, 
namely that someone who is self-employed has greater opportunities to avoid taxes 
than a salaried worker. This is a circumstance that fits nicely into the approach of this 
Handbook. Specifically, it shows that self-employment cannot be uncritically taken as 
synonymous with productive entrepreneurship. Basically, individuals can enter into 
self-employment for several reasons, one of them being the opportunity to avoid 
taxes. 
In addition to this, Robson and Wren assume the effort level to be higher in 
self-employment on the margin. Hence, the entrepreneur faces higher marginal taxes. 
These two assumptions result in two theoretical predictions: that the self-employment 
rate varies negatively with marginal taxes and positively with average taxes. 
The last theoretical article in this part does not deal with how taxes directly 
affect entrepreneurship. Keuschnigg and Nielsen [16] instead investigate taxes in 
relation to venture capital. Venture capital offers a contract that overcomes many of 
the problems of asymmetric information inherent in new firm start-ups. Moreover, 
venture capital firms take an active part in the management of the firm. It is this 
dimension, together with the amount of funding (i.e. entrepreneurial activity), which 
is the focus of Keuschnigg and Nielsen’s analysis. Their main result is that a capital 
gains tax reduces the amount invested but increases the quality of managerial advice.   12
Further, it is found that progressive rather than proportional income taxes distort 
investment decisions. 
 
There is a large literature which empirically investigates the effects of taxes on self-
employment. Although recent results indicate that the relation is negative, the results 
are inconclusive and an overall judgment is still premature. The main problem that 
research has tried to tackle deals with endogeneity. Since the effective tax rate is the 
result of the decision to enter into entrepreneurship, this is itself obviously not an 
exogenous determinant of entry. 
Time-series methods were the first to be applied to the issue of tax effects on 
small business creation. In these studies, using aggregate data for marginal tax rates 
typically circumvents the endogeneity problem. However, in the early studies, the 
evidence, if at all significant, indicated a negative effect. A recent update of these 
studies is Bruce and Mohsin [17]. They apply more sophisticated methods of time-
series analysis and do this on a dataset spanning a longer time-period than previous 
analyses. The strongest result is that the top corporate income tax rate has a negative 
effect on entrepreneurial activity. Moreover, effects are also found for payroll taxes. 
Even though these results provide evidence that taxes do affect entrepreneurial 
decisions, the authors point out that the identified effects are of a small magnitude. 
  An obvious limitation of time-series methods is the inability to account for the 
micro level. The study by Parker [18] is an example where binary-decision models are 
used to analyse cross-section micro-level data. He uses British cross-section data sets 
to test whether the tax liabilities that are conditional on self-employment affect 
entrepreneurial entry. However, the study fails to find evidence of tax effects on 
incentives to become an entrepreneur. 
  Recently, access to detailed longitudinal data has made it possible to overcome 
some of the shortcomings of earlier studies. Bruce [19] uses a panel data set from the 
US Panel Study of Income Dynamics survey to study how differential tax treatment of 
the self-employed affects decisions to enter or exit self-employment. The strategy for 
avoiding endogeneity is to use a tax reform as an exogenous variation in marginal tax 
rates for the self-employed. The results indicate that a lower marginal tax rate for the 
self-employed (keeping the income tax of employees constant) reduces 
entrepreneurial activity. 
Gentry and Hubbard [20] use the same dataset as Bruce, but instead focus on 
tax progressivity. Theoretically, we have already seen that increased progressivity 
should be expected to have a negative effect on self-employment rates. Gentry and 
Hubbard’s results are consistent with this hypothesis; increased convexity in the tax-
rate reduces entrepreneurial activity. Further, the effects of a reform can be large. An 
increase in the marginal tax spread between successful and unsuccessful ventures 
from 2 to 7 percent is associated with a reduction in the probability of entering self-
employment by 9 percent. 
In a number of studies, Carroll, Holtz-Eakin, Rider and Rosen investigate the 
tax-effect on existing small firms. In [21], they analyse the effects on decisions to 
increase the number of employees. For this purpose, they use a panel of small firms in 
the US. They have observations before and after a major hike in marginal tax rates, 
which is used as an exogenous source of variation. The firm’s probability of hiring 
was found to decrease substantially after the reform. Raising the marginal tax rate by 
10 percent reduced the probability of hiring by 12 percent. 
   13
This part has dealt with many facets of taxation in relation to entrepreneurship. The 
main lesson we want to emphasize is that the sheer number of small businesses 
created is not the only outcome variable of relevance. It is likely to be even more 
important to look at what types of businesses are created and their prospects for 
survival and growth. If, for instance, the reason why high tax rates stimulate the 
creation of new firms is the greater scope for tax evasion, then one must question 
whether and to what extent these new firms contribute to growth. 
 
 
PART IV  SUBSIDIES TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 
The selected articles in the next section deal with support and programs designated to 
entrepreneurship. This part contains articles more generally analysing the 
consequences of subsidies to lending. A common point of departure for these studies 
is that the financial market works imperfectly. In the context of entrepreneurship, this 
usually translates into problems of asymmetric information regarding the abilities of 
the nascent entrepreneurs, his/her prospects and the risk of the project. Among 
entrepreneurship scholars, a consensus that small firms and nascent entrepreneurs face 
financial constraints has gradually emerged. The conclusion that is generally drawn is 
that something should be done to promote and support the formation of new firms. 
The first article in this part, Gale [22], is a quantitative simulation analysis of 
the effects of government credit subsidies. Substantial crowding-out effects and 
efficiency losses are found. Furthermore, the results indicate that the major part of the 
welfare gains accrue to groups which would not have been credit constrained even 
without the subsidy. 
The second paper by DeMeza [23] puts many implicit assumptions on their 
head. One such conjecture is that more risk-taking in the form of small-business start-
up is, in a normative sense, a good thing. But deMeza points at two circumstances that 
lead to excessive risk-taking. Both of these are externalities resulting when the most 
able individuals venture into self-employment. When this happens, the returns to 
employment drop, giving more and less able employees an incentive to venture into 
self-employment. At the same time, the rate of failure of small firms is low as long as 
only individuals with high abilities are self-employed. This implies a downward 
pressure on borrowing rates and, consequently, even larger flows of people into self-
employment. From these two factors, it can be deduced that the distribution of talent 
is sub-optimal. This result questions the received view that the government should 
provide financial aid to small firms. Instead of a shortage of entrepreneurial start-ups, 
deMeza argues that too many small firms are started. And, by providing assistance to 
new firms, the government only makes things worse. 
The article by Li [24] explicitly investigates the effect of various government 
support schemes. This is done in a model with financial market frictions. One result is 
that loan guarantees have the most detrimental incentive effects. Loan guarantees give 
the investor an assurance that the government will step in if the entrepreneur defaults 
on his loans. This attracts very risky projects. Furthermore, grants given to the 
entrepreneur at the end of a specified period are found to be the most efficient way of 
stimulating a specific kind of entrepreneurship. A general result is that all kinds of 
subsidies result in more investment in new firms but reduced private savings. 
Keuschnigg and Nielsen [25] analyse the effect of government subsidies on 
venture capital. As we have already seen, government support is likely to lead to 
crowding-out effects. The results in Keuschnigg and Nielsen suggest that these effects   14
do not only hurt similar types of financial means, but also other forms such as venture 
capital finance. They find that subsidizing investment is likely to cause the venture 
capitalists to cut back on their managerial support, thus increasing the risk of failure. 
The only kind of support that can be efficiency enhancing is managerial and 
information services – conditional on the government being a better advisor than the 
venture capitalist. 
A dam is probably a good illustration of a common way of considering 
financial constraints. According to this metaphor, the dam obstructs and hinders the 
flow of entrepreneurship and productivity, and the aim of policies is to release this 
energy. But what if the freed water-reserve were not to flow orderly in one stream? 
And what if we could only remove the dam piecewise by blowing a hole here and 
there without knowing the exact consequences? Would not the water then flow in 
highly unpredictable and uncontrolled ways? We deem that this latter image is more 
appropriate in the context of entrepreneurship. The articles in this part have presented 
some advances towards understanding the complexity of financial constraints. The 
attempt to move away from considering financial constraints as simply an unnatural 
impediment is, in our view, particularly promising. 
 
 
PART V  ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICIES  
 
In recent decades, entrepreneurship and small businesses have loomed large both on 
the political and the research agenda. Therefore, relevant institutions also include the 
wealth of policy measures that have been designed and specifically directed toward 
small firms. A broad division of these programs are financial support schemes, tax 
breaks and subsidies, advisory services and science parks. 
  Gilbert, Audretsch and McDougall [26] discuss a number of ways in which 
recent changes in the industrial and market structure have emphasized the importance 
of small businesses, and how governments around the world and at different levels 
have responded to this. On the surface of things, governments scaled down their 
involvement in markets, primarily through a wave of privatisations beginning in the 
1980s. However, the analysis of this paper draws the attention to another 
interpretation; parallel to the increased importance of the small firm, governments 
changed the focus of their interventions. In practice, this is reflected in a dramatic 
increase in programs aimed at small businesses. 
The rationale behind such interventions is discussed by Holtz-Eakin [27]. To 
motivate government intervention from an efficiency perspective, one would have to 
point at some kind of externalities generated by small firms. In this respect, it is 
common to refer to the contribution of small firms to innovativeness and renewal at 
the aggregate level. These are effects that presumably benefit many economic agents 
but are not internalised at the individual firm level. Another line of argument for 
special support to small firms has already been discussed, namely their susceptibility 
to capital-market imperfections. 
Overall, Holtz-Eakin deems that the motives discussed for special support to 
small firms are weak. In addition, we want to emphasize what we consider to be the 
most critical aspect of such programs, namely the fact that they ultimately hinge on 
the ability of the government, and the appointed executive agency, to pick the right 
firms to support. Here, it should be noted that if entrepreneurship is seen as the ability 
to perceive and be alert to opportunities, this selection process actually means that the 
government is trying to fill the entrepreneurial function.   15
 
A number of studies have been devised to evaluate the impact of entrepreneurship 
programs. These studies typically find a positive effect on the supported firms. One 
such study is Lerner [28] who investigates the effect of the US Small Business 
Innovation Research Program. He follows a large number of firms over a ten-year 
period. Some firms in this panel received support in the form of a grant, others were 
matched firms included as a control group. The firms that participated in a program 
enjoyed much higher growth rates than did a matching firm without support. 
Interestingly, the result did not show any correlation between the success rate and the 
level of support. One interpretation is that the primary benefit of the program was as a 
“stamp of approval”, a kind of certificate signalling the prospects of the firm to other 
agents. 
  Wren and Storey [29] look at a different type of support. They use UK data to 
investigate the effects of subsidised support for marketing, directed toward small 
firms. They find a large positive effect of the program on survival and employment 
growth. When dividing the sample into small, medium and large firms, the effect was 
heavily concentrated to the middle stratum. One way of interpreting this is that too 
small and too large firms are unable to accommodate the support in a beneficial way. 
Another suggestive result that emerged was that the kind of firms that were granted 
support had greater survival but poorer growth prospects than other firms. Even 
though the exact implications of this are difficult to disentangle, it highlights the 
crucial fact that the effect of a program will crucially depend on how the support is 
directed. 
  A common shortcoming of this kind of studies is that they can only generate 
knowledge about partial-equilibrium properties. No account is taken of implications 
for the income side of the government budget, and the possibility of efficiency losses 
from financing the programs. The studies are equally silent about crowding-out 
effects on private agents. But most crucial is probably the neglect of the effect of 
promoting a specific kind of firms on the overall industry structure, and how this 
feeds back to other firms. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to say anything 
empirically about the overall outcome in these respects. One exception, however, is 
Cumming and MacIntosh [30] who rely on a Canadian program to analyse the impact 
on the supply of venture capital. They find this tax-based program to have severe 
crowding-out effects on private sources of finance. Crowding-out takes place to such 
an extent that the overall supply of venture capital in the economy actually declined as 
an effect of the program. 
 
 
PART VI  POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 
Hitherto we have primarily been interested in how various politically determined 
institutions affect entrepreneurship. In this part and those that follow, we will turn to 
the opposite causality and study different ways in which entrepreneurship contributes 
to and transforms the institutional framework. That an entrepreneur has incentives to 
engage in such activities is easily seen against the background of the directed 
activities discussed in the previous part. For instance, it can be highly profitable for an 
entrepreneur to try to influence the programs and tailor the criteria for eligibility to his 
own needs. In this part, we will see how entrepreneurship is of direct relevance for the 
study of the political sphere.   16
  Holcombe [31] introduces the concept of entrepreneurship in politics. A 
political entrepreneur is someone who, just as in the market place, is alert to, and acts 
upon, opportunities for profit. Now, there are two types of opportunities. The first is 
to remove inefficiencies by restructuring government activities. This is the kind of 
opportunity with the potential of yielding benefits to broad strata of the population. 
The second kind of opportunity is the (forcible) transfer of wealth from one group to 
another. These latter, predatory, forms of entrepreneurship tend to be more common 
in politics than in economic markets. The most important reason for this is the 
coercive element in politics. Agents do not have the option of not partaking in the 
game governed by political institutions. Furthermore, citizens that are not active in 
politics must obey the law, and also those that have not actively resisted a transfer of 
wealth are affected by it. Thus, predatory political entrepreneurship can be said to 
have a high leverage and, if successful, it can yield large returns. Thus, in contrast to 
economic entrepreneurship, political entrepreneurship does not necessarily (or even 
primarily) contribute to efficiency. Finally, Holcombe also makes the important 
observation that there will always be opportunities for redistribution in politics, even 
in an imagined state of equilibrium. 
  Holcombe’s analysis belongs to the Kirznerian tradition, where the 
entrepreneur’s alertness to opportunities is central. Wohlgemuth [32], on the contrary, 
is an attempt to draw out the implications of a Schumpeterian approach to political 
entrepreneurship. Two sides of Schumpeter are contrasted. The early Schumpeter saw 
entry of new actors as the driving force in the innovative process, while the later 
Schumpeter emphasized the role of the large established firm. Wohlgemuth frames 
the analysis of the democratic process in terms of Tullock’s concept of bidding for 
(political) monopoly. He does this in order to work out the consequences of various 
institutional arrangements on political reform and renewal. Renewal is here seen as 
the result of either of the Schumpeterian processes. 
These two articles belong to a rather small literature that tries to capture the 
effect of some of the more illusive dimensions of entrepreneurship. It has repeatedly 
been pointed out that entrepreneurship has for a long time been neglected in economic 
analysis, and that it has just recently made some advance into the mainstream of 
economic analysis. There is a similar neglect in the analysis of the political sphere. In 
this part, we include some components that are relevant to such an analysis. 
 
 
PART VII  POLITICAL MARKETS, INTEREST GROUPS AND 
COALITIONS  
 
A few words are in order to explain how this part differs from the previous one. Some 
of the selected articles in this part seemingly move away from the entrepreneur. They 
do so in the sense that they move away from the entrepreneur qua an individual 
economic agent. Instead, the focus is here on political coalitions and interest groups. 
In one respect, this is a distinction between the political process and the institutional 
set-up. In the previous part, no distinction between these two entities was necessary. 
In reality, this applies to countries where those in power have much discretionary 
power. But with respect to well functioning democracies, we believe that the 
distinction is important to make. Here, the institutional framework exhibits a great 
deal more inertia, and it evolves through a political process. The political element of 
entrepreneurship consists of acting through interest groups and changing the political 
power structure.   17
  Stigler [33] is a classic exponent of the mechanism behind the influence of 
economic interests in the political sphere. Bluntly, he presents a hypothesis that has 
been guiding much subsequent research: ”every industry or occupation that has 
enough political power to utilize the state will seek to control entry” (p. 5). The 
analysis dissects various ways of accomplishing such control, and why a political 
majority may accept such legislation. Most important for our purposes is the fact that 
the analysis brings forth a classic dilemma, namely that those who have benefited and 
thrived thanks to certain institutions may later act to change the same institutions in 
order to bar new entrants. Today’s successful entrepreneurs may be identical to those 
who will block new entrants in the future. 
  A proper understanding of this dilemma necessitates an investigation of how 
political coalitions are formed. In a setting where government taxation, redistribution 
and provision of public goods are endogenously determined through a voting process, 
the two coalitions of voters have traditionally been high- and low-income individuals. 
Roine [36] shows that in the presence of tax avoidance techniques, another pattern 
may emerge. If the cost of tax avoidance is sufficiently low, high-income individuals 
may form a coalition with low-income individuals in support of high taxes. Another 
instance where the rich might behave in an unexpected way is property rights 
protection. Sonin [35] analyses a model where the rich prefer poor public protection 
of property rights, since this allows them to extract rents from other groups while 
investing in private protection of their own property. 
  But the government is more than simply a vehicle for redistribution and the 
carrying out of legislation designed to fill the demands of special interests. More 
specifically, the government serves an important function as a third party in contract 
enforcement. Acemoglu and Verdier [34] build on this aspect. Entrepreneurial activity 
is here dependent on a well-functioning enforcement of property rights, which in their 
model can only be provided by the government. But an overly extensive government 
is associated with bureaucratic corruption. One of the contracting parties might find it 
profitable to bribe an official. These mechanisms have detrimental effects on the 
number of contracts signed and businesses started. 
  The spectrum from interest groups to rent seeking and corruption is wide, and 
we do not want to claim that it is only a question of degree. Rather, these phenomena 
represent different methods through which economic interests influence politics. 
Here, in the context of entrepreneurship, it is once more important to note the 
circularity. How the process of institutional change comes about, i.e. by which 
method it is materialized is, in turn, dependent on how the existing institutions 
channel entrepreneurial talent. If it is more profitable to devote energy to bribing 
officials or forming political alliances, entrepreneurial talent is directed to these areas 
rather devoted to more socially productive pursuits. 
 
 
PART VIII  INNOVATION AND VESTED INTERESTS  
 
An important instance of the mechanisms described in the previous section is the 
introduction of innovation and how this is resisted by some groups. Mokyr [37] 
analyses this resistance to new innovations in terms of two evolutionary systems, one 
technical and one politico-social. These two systems develop in tandem, with several 
points of mutual interaction. Mokyr discusses informally how evolvement in the 
technological system, through the introduction of new innovations, creates tensions in 
the other politico-social system. Many individuals find themselves at a disadvantage   18
when new innovations are introduced. There are several reasons for this. The first, and 
foremost, reason is that conversion of capital is seldom costless. This is true with 
respect to physical capital, but it is probably an even more acute problem when it 
comes to human capital. Since new innovation almost inevitably involves the 
reallocation of such resources, many groups normally face (at least) a short-term loss 
in terms of unemployment or capital obsolescence. 
Krusell and Ríos-Rull [38] analyse this logic in a formal model of overlapping 
generations. Here, investment in technology-specific skills creates vested interests. 
These coalitions can only be broken with the birth of a new generation. Hence, the 
introduction of new technology can be stalled for some time. In this framework, they 
also show that it is possible to have an equilibrium where the political majority shifts 
between allowing and banning new innovations. In the long run, this creates a cyclical 
pattern of technological progress in the market and, in the short run, it can be 
interpreted as a move to a more liberal (or a more conservative) regime. 
But, if the new technology increases productivity, why does the political 
majority not use its power to tax the gains from an improved production process, 
instead of banning it? This question was first raised by Acemoglu and Robinson [40]. 
They emphasized that the strength of the affected group must be taken into account. 
Bellettini and Ottaviano [39] build on this insight and develop a model where the 
regulation of new technology is determined by lobbying rather than voting. 
 
 
PART IX  ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SOCIAL MOBILITY  
 
In parts VII and VIII, we saw how the political sphere acts on and shapes the 
institutional environment in which entrepreneurs make decisions. One important 
component of this discussion was the active part that entrepreneurs play in political 
life. We now turn to how personal wealth may be used to wield political power. With 
respect to this issue, it is important to consider the great potential to create private 
wealth through entrepreneurship. Another issue, which we find to be equally 
important, but that has scarcely been studied, is the fact that this potential for wealth 
creation is a great threat to incumbent elites. This should make us wary of strategies 
for taming or restricting the influence of entrepreneurs. 
  Much economic research has been devoted to understanding the effect of 
various dimensions of taxation on economic equality. In a quantitative study, Meh 
[41] replicates a frequent result from such studies, namely that decreased income tax 
progressivity leads to increases in wealth inequality. However, there is a dramatic 
change when the entrepreneur is introduced into this analysis. The effect of a tax 
reform that reduces progressivity now has a negligible effect on inequality. The 
general equilibrium mechanism behind this result is that higher net income for 
entrepreneurs translates into more investments. This, in turn, increases wages, which 
counteracts the effect on the distribution of wealth. 
  The analysis in Quadrini [42] departs from Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
data. Two facts emerge from the descriptive statistics: (i) the distribution of wealth is 
heavily biased towards entrepreneurs; (ii) this is not only due to higher incomes 
earned by entrepreneurs because entrepreneurs also have a substantially higher 
wealth-to-income ratio than employees. Quadrini develops a model to account for 
these facts, where individuals with the potential of becoming entrepreneurs save more 
as a result of three things. First, these households have an incentive to save in order to 
raise sufficient funds to realize their business plans. Second, saving is preferred to   19
more expensive external financing. And third, there are more precautionary savings 
among entrepreneurs in order to counteract the greater exposure to risk. 
  Another result that emerged from Quadrini’s empirical analysis was that 
individuals engaging in entrepreneurial ventures show a higher degree of social 
mobility. Higher incomes coupled with a greater savings ratio account for this. Holtz-
Eakin, Rosen and Weathers [43] provide some further insights based on the same data 
source. They conclude that, in general, people engaging in entrepreneurial activities 
are more socially mobile. But the direction of this mobility varies across income 
groups. People belonging to low income groups and starting their own business are 
more likely to end up in a higher social group than their peers, whereas for people in 
high-income brackets, entrepreneurship makes a fall in relative income more likely. 
In this part, we have treated entrepreneurs as synonymous to business-owners. 
Therefore, it is important to remember that entrepreneurship in a political economy 
context is a much broader concept. A more comprehensive account of the effect of 
entrepreneurship on social mobility would not only include income and wealth effects 
of business ownership, the effects of less productive kinds of entrepreneurship would 
also be recognized. Even the kind of entrepreneurship which is, from a social 
perspective, destructive may have a very positive income effect for a subgroup of the 
population. It is plausible that such accounts would ascribe an even more important 
role to entrepreneurship in changing the socio-economic structure. 
 
 
PART X  ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 
 
Much of what has been said about the importance of institutions favouring the 
promotion of productive entrepreneurship is of even greater relevance in the context 
of transition economies. The legacy of socialist institutions continues to influence the 
environment in these countries. This increases the variance in institutional quality 
across these countries and regions within them. From an analytic point of view, this 
makes transition economies especially interesting to study. This environment also 
highlights another issue, namely whether and in what way entrepreneurs can 
contribute to the transformation of the institutional framework. 
  Entrepreneurs face special problems in transition economies. These problems 
fall into two categories: institutions that impede entrepreneurs and the lack of 
supporting institutions. Corruption among officials, long and bureaucratic processes 
of applications and certification for new firms and harassment from large, former 
state-owned firms belong to the former category. Low-quality bank procedures and 
poor enforcement of contracts are the most serious items in the second category. 
Chilosi [45] discusses many of these problems in detail. He also points to the danger 
of equating small-firm creation with productive entrepreneurship. Institutional quality 
in transition economies makes these countries more susceptible to other, less-
productive, forms of entrepreneurship. 
  McMillan and Woodruff [44] examine how entrepreneurs facing deficient or 
missing institutions manage to form strategies to overcome these problems. They 
stress the importance of close relations and repeated interaction among business 
partners. In the context of a transition economy, cooperation is facilitated by high 
search costs for alternative partners, geographical proximity and close social networks 
implying a high cost of malfeasance. But, at the same time, it is made more difficult 
by competition for scarce credit and a high discount rate due to high interest rates and 
large current profits. As pointed out in the article, these compensating arrangements   20
can only help firms up to a certain size; growth beyond this point requires well-
functioning formal institutions. 
  Smallbone and Welter [46] discuss the role of the government, and how 
policies in transition economies can be designed so as to promote entrepreneurship. 
This is done by presenting results from surveys of business owners’ own opinions 
about the role of the government and what problems regarding institutions are the 
most urgent. They conclude that the government has an important role to play, but 




PART XI  ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE WELFARE STATE  
 
The last part is, as the previous one, devoted to a whole set of institutions, more 
precisely the kind of institutions comprising the welfare state. Prominent features of 
such states are: extensive measures of redistribution, public provision of key service 
sectors such as health care and education and a comprehensive social-security system. 
Taken together, the institutions in place to achieve these goals constitute a very 
special context for the entrepreneur to act within. 
Sinn [47] builds on the idea that the institutions of the welfare state provide a 
kind of insurance. Social insurance, understood in a broad sense incorporating all 
types of welfare arrangements and redistributive schemes, allows the government to 
share part of the entrepreneur’s gains as well as his or her losses. Hence, they have the 
effect of decreasing the variance of peoples’ living standards, irrespective of their 
success or failure as entrepreneurs or employees. If people are assumed to be risk 
averse, this should translate into more risk-taking behaviour. Thus, the conclusion of 
Sinn’s analysis is that welfare state institutions are expected to promote 
entrepreneurship. 
Explicitly arguing against Sinn, Ilmakunnas and Kanniainen [48] point to the 
circumstance that the welfare state insures entrepreneurship and labour risks 
differently. In particular, since many welfare schemes are tied to employment, this 
increases the opportunity cost of entrepreneurial venturing. In a formal occupational 
choice model, they show that welfare institutions weaken the incentives to become an 
entrepreneur. Empirical evidence consistent with this proposition is also presented. 
Henrekson [49] provides a comprehensive survey of the welfare state 
institutions that are most pertinent with respect to entrepreneurship. The incentive 
effects of taxation, redistribution, government production of major services and other 
key dimensions of the welfare state are examined in detail. In the context of Sweden, 
it is also shown that the empirical evidence is broadly consistent with what is 





As we have seen, it is no coincidence that core theoretical inquiries into 
entrepreneurship have put the entrepreneur in a political economy context. However, 
this tendency has been lost in most of the recent literature, where it is just assumed 
that entrepreneurship is beneficial for society, while the risk of rent-seeking and 
political entrepreneurship as an effect of inappropriate institutions is overlooked. In 
this survey, we have ascribed vital functions of the capitalist economy to the   21
productive entrepreneur. But, at the same time, we hope that the articles in this 
Handbook taken as a whole show that the social value of entrepreneurship should be 
evaluated as it is realized. Entrepreneurship cannot uncritically be taken as the answer 
to the quest for economic growth. 
 
We have discussed three major aspects of entrepreneurship that are important from a 
political economy perspective. First, entrepreneurship, regarded as a resource, is in 
essence dynamic. It is dynamic in the sense that it will adjust to the politically 
determined institutional framework within which it acts. Under propitious 
circumstances, it can be a powerful engine of growth, but it can also be channelled in 
unproductive and destructive directions. Thus, it is important to discern which 
institutions are particularly important and what are the effects of these pertinent 
institutions on entrepreneurship. 
 
Second, entrepreneurship enters directly into the political system. The close 
connection to property rights constitutes a link between entrepreneurship and private 
versus public ownership and redistribution. Under unfavourable institutional 
circumstances, rent-seeking and predatory entrepreneurship via the political system 
offer greater profit opportunities than the market. In addition, entrepreneurial rents 
provide opportunities for the individual to amass great private wealth. The question 
then arises of whether and how this wealth translates into political power. 
 
Third, a political economy approach is important in order to understand how the 
political system shapes the institutional setup. How does entrepreneurship enter in the 
formation of different political coalitions? How do vested interests and the current 
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